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If we consider civil disobedience to be established on 
moral grounds, it implies that before adopting it as a form 
of protest all the available means of the current political 
system (which is being disputed) must have already been 
used, that it must involve open and non-violent action and 
the acceptance of punishment. The term »disobedience to 
the state« is preferred because it implies universality as 
its essential dimension. The criterion of immorality, against 
which the protest is directed, are crimes against humanity 
and nature. The right to resist to actions performed by the 
state (the basis of disobedience to the state) ensues from 
the existence of parliamentary democracy, as well as does 
the duty of obedience towards democratically enacted laws. 
By disobedience one can dispute those laws and acts which 
although laid down in a correct formal procedure, function 
contrary to the supposed social contract. In order to pre­
vent actions of disobedience from becoming confined to 
the promotion of individual advantage or particular inter­
est, the additional responsibility to be fitted into an overall 
plan of creating a new order (based on the abolition of the 
current hierarchical society) must be accepted. Therefore, 
the act of disobedience, apart from anticipating the elem­
ents of a new society must ensure that the alternative plan 
also be desired by other citiyens. Responsible citizenship 
opposes the dominant cultural model (of ensuring social 
peace by preventive intimidation) on the grounds of a 
competing model (based on a community independent of 
those in power and on unathoritarian human dignity). Re­
sponsible citizenship necessarily implies antimilitarism.
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1. Introduction
Militarism is understood here to mean a system for the preparation and 
waging of war. As a corollary, the system requires obedience on the part of 
those subject to it. Obedience is a psychological and/or socio-psychological 
precondition for the preparation and waging of war. War is regarded here not 
only as morally reprehensible also as what the Dutch economist Tinbergen 
has callcd »the most blatant example of conterproduction«. Conterproduction 
is the destructive effect of certain forms of production (which also include 
vandalism and environmental pollution).
Efforts to combat militarism are expressed among other things in anti- 
militarism. This resistance is directed not only against the destructive urge 
which militarism elevates to a norm for human conduct. It also rejects the 
disciplinary model which forms the basis for all kinds of social norms and 
standards designed to inculcate obedience in the general public and to pro­
duce model citizens anxious to discharge their duties as »voter«, »employee«, 
»taxpayer« and »soldier« Antimilitarism is not therefore simply the expres­
sion of moral indignation at the destruction of life. It is also concerned to 
denounce the role of the state in organising destruction on a systematic basis. 
In this sense, antimilitarism can also be regarded as a form of anarchism 
and disobedience to the state as an act of responsible citizenship.
I should like to warn here against a possible misunderstanding, especial­
ly in view of the subject matter with which I shall be dealing. Even if we 
imagine a situation in which the state has been replaced by an anarchist 
society, this would not necessarily imploy the complete absence of any system 
of rights and duties. It goes without saying, for instance, that a society in 
which everyone would have sufficient for his or her would inevitably require 
a production system, otherwise there would be no means of satisfying these 
needs.
To put it another way, the duty »to produce according to ability« should 
be recognized as an absolute precondition of being able to enjoy the advan­
tages of a social system modelled on the lines of »to each according to his 
needs«. I can see absolutely no reason why a system of rights and duties of 
this kind should not be classified as a legal system. It is after all a system 
of social cooperation, which gives rise to certain rights and duties. These 
duties are not imposed from above by the state but are inherent in the way 
in which the society in question is organised. Mechanisms to create and 
enforce rules can therefore exist even in systems where there is no state. 
These mechanisms arc then rooted in the very social groups which are bo­
und by the rules in question.
Antimilitarism in the Netherlands has at lcats two different roots, namely 
the labour movement and Christianity in its original form. One of the best 
known pioneers of antimilitarism was Domel Nieuwenhuis (1846—1919), ex- 
-clergyman and later anarcihst. He became an antimilitarist in 1872.
The doctrine of liberal pacifism was preached in those days by the Dutch 
Peace League, a far from radical organisation which existed from 1871 to 
1901. The true radicals were the people and groups of (Christian-) anarchist 
or syndicalist persuasion.
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One individual whose background combined various of these facets was 
Bart de Ligt (1883—1938), an ex-clergyman. He was one of those who ensur­
ed that the peace movement devoted itself to the cause of developing a new 
pattern of conduct. This was to be characterised by a high degree of maturity, 
of what De Ligt termed »mental resilience«. This resilience was to be a state 
of mind, which would enable them to espouse the cause of non-violent action 
and to continue to regard their opponents as fellow human beings.
General community interest
It may at first sight seem strange to introduce a discussion of civil dis­
obedience and responsible citizenship with a reference to the development of 
Dutch antimilitarism. Nowadays, after all, the term civil disobedience is used 
indiscriminately to cover everything from garage proprietors closing off a 
road to the masters of inland waterways vessels blocking shipping in a lock. 
What these acts have in common is that they are intended to promote the 
special interests of a given individual or group. De Ligt's point was precisely 
that civil disobedience involves matters of much wider import, and involves 
actions based for instance on the realisation that modern political and econ­
omic policy is essentially anti-Christian (see his speech on this subject in 
1915).
One of the criteria for civil disobedience is that it should be in the inter­
ests of the community at large. Bart de Ligt made this distinction in 1916 
when he was tried among other things for sedition. The charge was brought 
because he had taken an active part in a demonstration against national serv­
ice. He maintained that refusing to take service in the armed forces as a mat­
ter of conscience is an act of the highest moral principle. In this way he im­
plicitly introduced the idea of responsible citizenship. He described the act 
of refusal as a representative act: a conscientious objector sets an example 
which must ultimately be followed by people in general. Da Ligt did not 
mince his words: he acknowledged that he was engaged in a struggle against 
the state as an instrument of violence. This is one reason why I prefer 
to speak of disobedience to the state rather than of civil disobedience. I shall 
deal with this point in section II.
One of the people who was involved, briefly but very intensely, in dis­
seminating these ideas was the libertarian lawyer and social philosopher Cla­
ra Wichmann (1855—1922). Contemporaries marvelled at the way in which 
she could expound ideas of a radically antimilitarist nature in the most soft 
but compelling terms. She met Bart de Ligt in 1917 at the International 
School for Philosophy where she had lectured since 1916. With De Ligt and 
others she established the »League for Revolutionary Socialist Intellectuals« 
in 1919. In the same year she co-founded the »Committee for Action against 
the Existing Concepts of Crime and Punishment«. She was thus concerned 
with the defence of humanity in all its aspects.
De Ligt, Wichmann and others hoped to achieve their antimilitaristic 
aims through taking an active part in organisations such as the Internatio­
nal Anti-Militaristic Association and the International Anti-Militaristic Bur­
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eau. The function of the latter, for instance, was to convince the members 
of the working population that they possessed the decisive economic force 
and to encourage both individuals and the public at large to refuse to take 
service in the armed forces and to cease forthwith all war work of both a 
direct and an indirect nature.
New pattern of conduct
The world is today faced with the horrors of war on a scale hitherto 
unimaginable. Hardly anyone needs to be convinced nowadays of the dangers 
threatening us. What is now even more relevant, therefore, is to show that 
the new pattern of conduct to which De Ligt referred must be »lived« if we 
are to have a chance of survival. In other words, resistance is necessary. In 
the remainder of this article I shall expound various arguments in support 
of resistance.
To support my thesis I shall use texts produced by people of a similar 
persuasion both recently and in the more distant past. I shall not quote 
them individually in the normal way but shall instead list them at the end.
Section II deals with the subject of »Civil disobedience and the state«. 
Here I shall indicate the problems that arise in the use of the term »civil 
disobedience«, and propose instead to classify the various elements of resi­
stance as »disobedience to the state«. A duty to obey clashes with a duty to 
resist, the two duties being derived from opposing views of life. I indicate 
how and why the two are interrelated, in some respects in a positive way.
In section III I shed more light on this by examining in some detail the 
idea of responsible citizenship. This involves a certain unit of style developed 
within a competing cultural model. At certain times responsible citizenship 
necessitates disobedience to the state, if only because of the fact that the sta­
te is an institute of violence and argues in defence of its own interests. As a 
resposible citizen the duty one owes to one’s fellow man takes precedence 
over the duty one owes to the state.
People have no prior commitment to the system but only to their fellow 
citizens. Finally, I urge that we should continue to build upon the tradition 
of antimilitarism and serve notice that we resist.
2. Civil Disobedience and the State
Non-violent resistance, refusal to take service in the armed forces, resp­
onsible production, defence of humanity; all are acts of opposition which 
may be covered by the use of the term civil disobedience. The extent to which 
there covered depends, of course, on the definition one uses. If one ac­
cepts the definition given by a Dutch ethicist such as G. Manenschijn in his 
detailed study of the term, hardly any grounds can be advanced to justify 
acts of civil disobedience. I would have to disagree with him. Everywhere we 
look, nations are manufacturing nuclear weapons and other instruments of 
war on a scale which makes the word »overkill« completely inadequate, and
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the survival of entire species of animals and plants is being threatened by 
wasteful and destructive methods of production and consumption. And all 
the while the people who work to produce the goods have little or no say in 
what they produce. Such situations (and I could give many more examples) 
can only be described as immoral. People who generate resistance to them and 
press for change do not act out of self-interest or in the interest of a limited 
group. On the contrary, they act to safeguard universal interests, to resist 
crimes against humanity and against nature.
Civil Disobedience
The resistance to which I have referred above can take many forms. 
One of them is civil disobedience. What kind of acts constitute civil disobe­
dience? To answer this, many writers in Holland refer to the dissertation 
on »Law, Order and Civil Disobedience« by the legal sociologist C.J.M. Schuyt 
(Roterdam, 1972). Ten years after publishing this dissertation, however, the 
same author indicated in a new study that there are a great many kinds of 
action and resistance (he lists around a thosand examples) which are not 
covered by the term civil disobedience as originally defined by him. His mo­
dified definition of civil disobedience is »in principle non-violent infringement 
of the law whereby a moral protest is made against some act or omission by 
political or administrative bodies«. It is therefore a form of protest on moral 
grounds or, as the English anarchist, activist and political scientist April 
Carter has said, »a refusal to act in accordance with a law which is intrinsi­
cally immoral or which unjustifiably infringes a person’s rights«. The pro­
blem then becomes to define what one means by immoral and what consti­
tutes an unjustifiable infringement of a person’s rights. To answer these 
questions, people often have recourse to moral judgements based on their 
own personal conscience. Claiming exemption for oneself on these grounds 
as in the case of refusal to take service in the armed forces is one thing. It is 
quite another, however, to use one’s personal convictions as the basis for 
action to compel other people to take a decision which they would not 
otherwise take. Whatever the case, the term civil disobedience necessarily 
implies open and non-violent action. Its purpose after all is to convince others 
of the justness of a cause.
To achieve this goal, it is necessary to work on many fronts; this means 
that before adopting a policy of civil disobedience all the legal and political 
means available to bring about the necessary change or to display resistance 
must have been used. It follows from the above that civil disobedience cons­
titutes an infringement of the law which is out of the »ordinary«, particular­
ly since it involves acceptance of the punishment (an extra factor included 
in most definitions of civil disobedience).
Disobedience to the state
In view of the above I prefer to speak not of civil disobedience but of 
disobedience to the state, because the open and non-violent resistance is
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directed against the immorality of the state. The next problem, therefore, is 
to define what we mean by immorality. Economists of a given ilk may find 
the creation of national debt to be immoral, but even if they were to resist 
they could hardly be said to be guilty of civil disobedience. Needless 
to say, I am thinking here more particularly of crimes against huma­
nity and nature (far-reaching disruption or destruction of the social and na­
tural ecology), of the subjection of man and his natural environment to a 
destructive technology.
The state, seen here as a collection of agencies which have a multi-fuct- 
ional coercive monopoly in a given territory, is understood in this connection 
to be an organisational platform for the preparation and conduct of these 
forms of immorality. I would not of course suggest that the state was set up 
exclusively for this purpose or that the »state« cannot be defined in other 
ways. What I am concerned with here are the different facets of what I 
would call the »dominant state«.
Duty of obedience
One of the justifications usually advanced in the Netherlands for actions 
performed by or on behalf of the state is the existence of parliamentary 
democracy. The idea is that the individual members of society have agreed 
with one another that they will stand by the results of certain parliamentary 
procedures. These results are often referred to as laws or acts. Anyone who 
fails to observe the rules laid down in them is then said to violate the princip­
les of the parliamentary democracy, i.e. to act »undemocratically«. It follows 
that the existance of parliamentary democracy is interpreted as entailing a 
duty of obedience. Parlamentary democracy is thus said to be the product 
of a kind of social contract.
Since the concept of a social contract has been criticised strongly in an­
archist and other circles. I need not go into this here. The concept of the 
social contract can, however, be used to prove the opposite of what its ad­
vocates intend, namely to buttress resistance to the state rather than o le­
gitimate enforcement of obedience. Furthermore, it is very much open to doubt 
whether every form of disobedience is undemocratic. Under some circum­
stances, there , may perhaps be a duty to ignore rules. This is implicit in a 
maxim such as: »where justice becomes injustice, resistance becomes a du­
ty!« The Dutch legal sociologist Bruinsma, for instance, said in this connect­
ion that the right to resist entails the moral defence of actions to disrupt 
public order, in principle on a non-violent and open basis, as a protest aga­
inst official decisions or the lack of them. It is this right to resist of which
I speak. ..
Right to resist
The right to resist is not in fact a new phenomenon. In ancient Greece 
there were »monarchomachs« who resisted the autocrats, and in the 15th
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and 16th centuries a number of legal philosophers described themselves by 
the same term in relativising the power of the king. One of their theories, 
for instance, was the king should be obeyed insofar as he respected the agre­
ements, but that he could be deposed if he disregarded them. The theories 
of the »monarchomachs« formed the basis of Dutch resistance to the Spanish 
king and eventually led to the Act of Abjuration, whereby the end of Philip's
II rule was proclamen in 1581. A similar argument can be advanced today. 
If it is alleged that there is a duty of obedience, then it can be argued that 
such a duty revievs the theory of the supposed social contract between the 
state and the subject.
This contractual element relativises the absolute duty of obedience. A 
contract rests, after all, on a mutual obligation. If the consideration provided 
by the state is inadequate or unaccepatble (i.e. immoral), the citizen cannot 
be expected to obey the state in this particular respect. In other words, it 
is a question of selective obedience. Responsible citizenship may therefore 
necessitate disobedience, for instance if the state requires its subjects to be 
party to the violation of international rules of law. A good example is the 
»crime against peace« (as formulated at the Nuremberg Trial).
Two matters are central to a discussion of the principle of selective ob­
edience. The first is that the concept of a legal order should not be dismis­
sed out of hand. Instead it is the objectionable by-products of such orders 
which should be rejected. The second is the idea that there may be grounds 
for resistance if inadequate consideration is given to certain arguments in 
a decision-making process or if a given procedure fails to function properly.
The legal order
The following can be said with regard to the idea that the concept of the 
legal order should not be dismissed out of hand. Every legal order protects 
certain interests and fails to protect others. The question is: who or what is 
to decide what these interests should be? This is in fact another way of ask­
ing who has the power of appointment. An »etatistic« approach to the quest­
ion would yiled the answer that it was the government, parliament (the law). 
An anti-etatistic reply would be the individual or society.
The differences in the replies to question as to the source of the power 
to appoint may lead to a diversity of definitions of the content of the above- 
-mentioned interests which can be protected within a legal order, but which 
do not necessarily have to lead to the rejection of every form of legal order. 
The maxim »your legal order is not ours« does not necessarily imply a rej­
ection of every form of legal order. If the maxim is not interpreted as re­
quiring the termination of the existing legal order, it still does not mean 
this order should be considered as not susceptible to any form of change 
whatsoever. I am convinced that it is possible both to work for a different 
social system (and in consequence for a different legal order as well) and at 
the same time to challenge the existing legal order to show whether it is 
capable of change.
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Situations occur in which changing social norms become completely at 
odds with the standards of behaviour permitted by law. In such cases people 
who act in accordance with these new social norms are committing an of­
fence under the law. What is challenged in this connection is not the legal 
order as a whole but the relevant element in the legal order. By legal order 
I mean here the entire body of mechanisms which are anchored in a cong­
lomerate of social groups and are created for the purpose of creating and 
enforcing rules. In some cases the court is willing to pardon a person who 
has infringed the law by acting in accordance with the changing norms of 
society. Such actions should then be seen as carefully considered and morally 
justified infringements of outdated legislation. By outdated I mean in relat­
ion to the changing social norms. The court then rules that the offender has 
acted within the legal order, but in this case the law is formed by society 
itself. This is recognised by the court. People can also resist in ohter ways 
but at the same remain within the bounds of the legal order. This occurs for 
instance when principles such as »equal treatment« and »respect« are invok­
ed. A society which permits buildings to remain empty at a time of great 
homelessness should be prepared for squatters to invoke »the right to ac­
commodation« as a principle taking precedence over positive law. A similar 
situation occurs when people press for recognition of the right to refuse mil­
itary service on the grounds of conscience and openly adopt an attitude of 
defiance to the relevant legislation. Such an attitude on the one hand involv­
es the strategic use of the law, and on the other makes it crystal clear that 
the acts in question are not civil disobedience but disobedience to the state. 
In resisting the persons concerned are exercising their rights as responsible 
citizens, which they consider are being frustrated by the state.
This in fact represents not the end but the start of the discussion, bec­
ause the next questioon is what is the source of the principles by which a 
person is guided in discharging his duites as a citizen. Does not (lead) living 
to those principles lead to what other sections of the population would term 
fanatasticsm? Examples abound of conduct based on the highest principles 
which may be derided or rejected by others. We all know of cases of memb­
ers of religious communities who refuse to allow vaccination or insurance 
on religious grouds. I shall not go into this here. What I am concerned with 
is to say something about a possible link-up with disobedience to the state 
and non-cooperation. Non-cooperation is therefore based on a refusal to co­
operate with instructions given by the state, which would make the indivi­
dual concerned an accessory to a violation of international law. An example 
of this is the siting of cruise missiles, which constitutes a crime against 
peace.
Parliamentary decision-making
I now turn to the second aspect of the discussion on the right to resist. 
I posited that there may be a right to resist if certain arguments are not 
given due consideration in decision-making processes or if a given procedure 
has not functioned properly. By way of example I would refer to two pos-
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siblc scenarios which can occur at any level of legislative decision-making, 
i.e. even at the level of the local council. Both scenarios result in a »parli­
amentary decision«, but it is extremely doubtful whether they have the same 
effect in terms of their ability to legitimate actions and to compel individu­
als to obey them. If a decision is taken by a legislative body after 
mature consideration and without the imposition of a government 
whip, the procedure would seem to confer a resonable measure of legit­
imacy on the decision, particularly if account is taken of the interests of 
minorities. It would be very different, however, if the decision were forced 
through by party whip with only a small majority, frequently after emotional 
and confused debates, lobbying and all sorts of other tactical devices. Alt­
hough a resultion taken in this way would also be a majoritiy decision, its 
legitimating effect would be nil. In a pluriform society minorities (some of 
them relatively large) may feel pushed aside, sometimes to such an extent that 
they feel compelled to resort to disobedience to the state. Many people have 
already pointed out that in such cases disobedience to the state does not 
endanger parlamentary democracy but is, on the contrary, a signal that the 
actions of the authorities are no longer democratic. And this is indeed, ther­
efore, what happens. Needless to say, the people in power, i.e. those who 
are officially invested with power, do not see it like that. They see their 
power being undermined.
Double responsibility
It is hardly strange that people in power should feel threatened, because 
all kinds of action are indeed intended to bring about a radical change in the 
status quo in society. If a factory is occupied by the employees, this ought to 
be interpreted as a takeover of the management by the workers; squatting 
ought to be interpreted as a move to nationalise the housing stock; refusal to 
take service in the armed forces for reasons of conscience and the exercise 
of the right to resist ought to be seen as undermining the authority of the 
state to impose discipline and as constituting a political attack on the conc­
ept of state sovereignty. These inferred objectives point in the direction of 
the establishment of a society organised along horizontal lines, i.e. an anarc­
hist society, or at least the abolition of a hierarchical society organised along 
vertical lines. If there is no overall alternative social plan into which these 
objectives fit systematically, such actions will very soon become confined to 
achieving an individual advantage or furthering a particular interest. Such 
action should always therefore fulfil two objectives: the immediate one of 
resistance and the more distant one of bringing about a new society. It is 
not sufficient simply to confront those in power.
In short, disobedience to the state does not relieve the persons in que­
stion of responsibility for contributing to the success of introducing a differ­
ent social plan, on a step-by-step basis. This entails a double responsibility. 
First, there is the responsibility which is derived from citizenship, i.e. the 
duty to anticipate the elements of the new society. Resistance should never 
become blind resistance, however, because this often proves counterproduct­
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ive. Second, it is necessary to realise that this alternative social plan must 
also be desired and accepted by others. The person taking action is therefo­
re responsible for ensuring that this is the case. The maxim »your legal order 
isn't ours« can also have a boomerang effect in cases where the resistance 
is not directed exclusively against people in positions of power. Persons other 
than the rulers may justifably say to those taking action: »Your social plan 
isn't ours«. The ever-present danger is that history will repeat itself. People 
may be so convinced that their social plan is superior to all others that they 
resort to political terror or become fundamentalist fanatics to achieve their 
finite objective.
3. Responsible Citizenship and Antimilitarism
The first question to be asked here is how are we to find criteria for a 
definition of responsible citizenship. The answer is that it is necessary to 
look at the history of our society. I think it would be useful to speak here 
of cultural models. I believe that we can identify two, a dominant model 
and a competing or alternative model. People adhering to the doominant cul­
tural model are accustomed to thinking that if one wishes to have peace one 
must prepare oneself for total war. Their cultural style is based on the idea 
of deterrence, which is achieved primarly through the sheer quantity and 
gigantism. The underlying idea is to make people »subservient«, one of the 
first steps being to deter children from asking questions. Once children ha­
ve had it drummed in to them that their father knows better, they will be 
more receptive to the idea that others in positions of authority over them 
such as their teacher, and later their employer, vicar, doctor, etc. know bet­
ter. The ultimate step is to believe the politicans. The kind of state which 
such attitudes breed is a fascist state, for instance Mussolini's Italiy. Seen 
in a given light, it is the result of what we may term a »disciplining« model, 
which can lead to all kinds of subjection and repression. Ideas of this kind 
have recurred throughout history, and because they are always identifiable 
by the same common denominators, I would describe them in a general sense 
as a dominant cultural model. I shall not go into this further.
Competing cultural model
Given the fact that the same denominators of dominance occur throug­
hout the centuries, it is not so strange that the denominators of resistance 
to dominance have been the same down the ages. These denominators can 
be grouped together under the term »competing cultural model«.
A very early author who adhered to the competing cultural model was 
the Franch academic Jean Gerson (1362—1428), who taught in Paris. He be­
lieved that the socio-political community should be seen as an independent, 
autonomous corporation which arranges its own affairs without outside in­
terference. Since the highest power is vested in the community, the person in 
the position of highest authority is merely the servant of that community.
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Gerson concluded from this that a monarch who places himself above the 
law also places himself outside the community. In such circumstances, Gers­
on considered it completely legal for the subjects of the king to depose him. 
Gerson proclaimed that Christians were just as much subjects to a duty to 
promote universal peace as were kings. In this respect Gerson can be seen 
as a forerunner of pacifist humanists such as Erasmus,
The idea of a link between the holding of alternative views on the pref­
erred form of political organisation and on people and how they should func­
tion within that organisation was apparent even in Gerson's writings. It was 
no more coincidence, therefore, that I came across Gerson in my search for 
the constant factors in a competing cultural model. Both Manenschijn, who 
sought ideas for his study of civil disobedience, and Bart de Ligt, who at­
tempted to make a science of peace irenelogy, searched implicitly for con­
stants. It will come as no surprise, therefore, if I say that I derived the in­
formation about Gerson from these two authors. Although there was a gap 
of six centuries between their work, all three writers clearly spoke the same 
»language«. It is the »language« which requires that the »honnete homme« 
should be used as the yardstick for assessing values. It is the language in 
which human dignity is displayed. Its primary purpose (to quote the Dutch 
polemicist Ter Braak (1902—1940) is to resist human beings who dedicate 
their lives to cheapening and betraying our values. At one point Ter Braak 
stated that he would assume the name of Don Quijote, not in order to tilt 
at windmills, but rather to be spend longer ambling at his leisure through 
what he described as the settled continent of Europe. A careful listener may 
detect the voice of Bakunin here: »I will continue to be an impossible person 
as long as those who are now 'possible' remain as they are«. Ter Braak knew 
how to preserve human dignity.
Responsible citizenship
The moral principles such as honesty, decency, justness and universality 
which underlie full and responsible citizenship, in other words the princip­
les by which a decent person is guided, can be classified as the competing 
cultural model. A person who adheres to this model is guided not only by 
moral imperatives such as »do not kill, do not steal and do not lie« but also 
by the principles of equality and reciprocity which serve to legitimate our 
actions. These rules of legitimation refer to a given institutional form. Reci­
procity and equality are such important ingredients of communal life that 
they can be classified as a public form of an LAT relationship (Living Apart 
Together). The reciprocity is given such great emphasis in order to express 
the fact that no one may demand something as his right which another is 
not entitled to by law.
This can be seen as a means of preventing people pursuing their own 
interests at the expense of other people's interests. The institutional form in 
which this reciprocity and equality is expressed is characterised by horizontal 
relationships. The citizen is no longer a subject (and as such subordinate to 
governments), but is a full and equal participant in the decision-making proc­
389
Holterman, T., Responsible Citizenship, . . . Rev. za soc., Zgb., Vol XIX (1988), No 4 : 379—393
esses. This imposes special demands on the way in which the political dec­
ision-making processes are organised. If they are not alredy optimal, they 
should be improved by a process of what I would term »top reduction«, in 
ohter words decentralisation to promote levelling and ensure that the decis­
ions are taken at lower levels, in short »anarchisation«.
Here too we can see again the twin concepts of an alternative political 
organisation and alternative ideas on people and their functioning within the 
organisation. Against the background of what I have here termed the comp­
eting cultural model, Manenschijn rightly submits that the rational relisation 
that these basic rules of morality are necessary if we wish to be able to live 
together and survive, compels us to give greater social effect to these rules. 
And this greater social effect will be obtained only when all the members of 
a society are able to take part on an equal and reciprocal basis in decisions 
on the institutional form which such basic rules of morality must take. Any 
government or political organisation which blocks or opposes this is in fact 
knowingly throwing down a challenge. As Bart de Ligt said in 1925, this 
concept puts us firmly in the opposition camp. »And it may perhaps remain 
the opposition standpoint ... until the end of time. Nevertheless, it is the 
only standpoint worthv of a human being« (De Ligt, Geestelijk Weerbaar, 
1925).
Antimilitarism
However one defines terms such as responsible citizenship, human dig­
nity and human standpoint, they in any event imply renunciation of any 
part in war or preparations for war. Responsible citizenship includes antimil­
itarism. The rational realisation that leads to the acknowledgement of the 
necessity of rules in order to guarantee everyone’s safety and means of 
existence, also results in the realisation that there is a moral duty to obey 
such rules as are in the interests of society as a whole and are intended to 
produce an ordered and non-violent society. Yet it is the same rational gro­
unds that provide the basis for the argument in favour of a right to resist 
then the measures taken to preserve a given social structure are at odds with 
our dignity and values as human beings. Militarism is one such measure, if 
only because of the basic principle »do not kill«. Responsible citizenship thus 
provides both the moral duty to obey in order to preserve an ordered and 
non-violent society and the duty to resist anything which may endanger or 
undermine this moral duty.
The efforts to combat militarism and thus to defend humanity have been 
pursued in the Netherlands in a systematic manner by the two organisations 
referred to in the introduction namely the Anti-Militaristic Association and 
the Anti-Militaristic Bureau. One of the founders of the latter was Bart de 
Ligt (in 1921). He, together with Clara Wichmann (at that time an executive 
member of the organisation) and others both criticised systems which can 
support militarism and advocated the fostering of rational thought along 
the lines already indicated. At the same time they tried to arouse people’s 
consciences and foster new thinking and to promote a totally different form
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of education. De Ligt listed these three points as the weapons at the disposal 
of the antimilitarists. He also advocated non-violent resistance and respons­
ible production. People should not only actively combat antimilitarism but 
also refuse to produce the means of destruction. Through his commitment 
and his analysis of the problem, De Ligt contributed to what he desribed 
as the »science of peace« (irenelogy).
He continued his educational work by establishing a Peace Academy in 
Paris, where the first summer course started in 1938. His work was later 
taken over by many others, in the Netherlands for instance by the centre for 
Non-Violent Resistance. The antimilitaristic movement has a long tradition. 
People who aspire to be responsible citizens can draw on the knowledge and 
strenght of this movement to support them in their struggle. Now more than 
ever.
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ODGOVORNO DRŽAVLJANSTVO, 




Ukoliko građanska neposlušnost ima moralno uteme­
ljenje, ona podrazumijeva da se prethodno pokušalo sve 
što se moglo učiniti unutar važećeg sistema (koji se ospo­
rava), da je akcija otvorena i nenasilna, te da podrazumi­
jeva i spremnost da se prihvati kazna. Daje se prednost 
terminu »neposlušnost prema državi«, jer ukazuje na op­
ćenitost kao njenu bitnu dimenziju. Kriterij nemoralnosti 
kojoj se suprotstavlja jest zločin protiv ljudskosti i priro­
de. Pravo na otpor državnim aktima (temelj neposlušnosti 
prema državi) proizlazi iz demokratske konstitucije, kao 
što iz nje proizlazi i obveza poslušnosti demokratski do­
nesenim zakonima. Neposlušnošću se može osporavati ona 
akta koji, mada doneseni korektnom formalnom procedu­
rom, djeluju suprotno prešutnom društvenom ugovoru. 
Kako akcije neposlušnosti ne bi bile svedene na promoci­
ju individualnih prednosti i posebnih interesa, one mora­
ju prihvatiti i dodatnu odgovornost da budu uklopljene u 
cjelovit plan stvaranja novog društva (na osnovi dokida­
nja hijerarhijske organizacije postojećeg društva). Odatle 
slijedi da akcija neposlušnosti, osim što anticipira elemente 
novog društva, mora osigurati da i drugi državljani žele taj 
alternativni plan. Odgovorno državljanstvo suprotstavlja se 
dominantnom kulturnom modelu (osiguravanja društvenog 
mira preventivnim zastrašivanjem) na temelju konkurent­
nog modela (koji polazi od zajednice neovisne o vlastima 
i neautoritarnog dostojanstva čovjeka), i nužno implicira 
antimilitarizam.
(sa engleskog prevela: Sanja Vrhovec-Vučemilović)
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